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A B S T R A C T
This paper explores the conﬂict over shale gas exploration in Lancashire where the company Cuadrilla is pre-
paring to horizontally drill and hydraulically fracture the ﬁrst shale gas wells in England. At present, this is the
only location in Europe where new commercial exploration for shale gas is underway, thus the outcome has
wider signiﬁcance. The initial planning applications were refused by Lancashire County Council in June 2015.
The decisions were then appealed by Cuadrilla and there was a public enquiry in February and March of 2016.
On 6 October 2016, the central Government over-turned the initial decisions at one site and gave Cuadrilla more
time to address traﬃc concerns at the other. The paper uses the public enquiry to map the contours of the shale
gas conﬂict. It is divided into three sections. The ﬁrst explores public attitudes towards shale gas development in
the UK and reveals growing public awareness and increasing opposition. The second presents the conceptual
frame for the analysis, which includes both a critical assessment of the social licence to operate (SLO) and an
introduction to a social, actuarial, and political risk and licensing model (SAP Model). The third deploys the SAP
model to analyse the public enquiry. The model explains how Cuadrilla is able drill despite the absence of both a
local political and social licence to operate. It is concluded that unless the industry and the government can
address growing public concerns about shale gas development, continuing conﬂict could constrain commercial
development.
1. Introduction
Horizontal drilling and high volume hydraulic fracturing have re-
volutionised the oil and gas industry in the United States. Having ex-
pected to be a signiﬁcant importer of natural gas, in 2016 the US be-
came a net exporter, natural gas is replacing coal in power
generation—bringing carbon emissions—and industry now has access
to an inexpensive feedstock. However, the ‘fracking’ of hundreds of
thousands of wells is not without controversy and there is growing
public concern about the environmental and social impacts, with de-
velopment banned in several US states and localities (Thomas et al.,
2017a, 2017b; Partridge et al., 2017; Whitton et al., 2017; Gamper-
Rabindran, 2017). Given the positive macro-economic impact in the US,
it is no surprise that the UK government seeks to replicate the experi-
ence. By contrast, the European Commission, and many member states
and sub-national governments, have been more circumspect with bans
or moratoria in place (Van de Graaf et al., 2017). In Poland, where
support has been strongest (Goldthau and Sovacool, 2016; Lis and
Stasik, 2017), the industry is no longer a commercial prospect (LaBelle,
2017). On reﬂection, it is fair to say that the ‘shale gas revolution’ is
struggling to move beyond North America and in Europe the UK is a
litmus test for the future of shale gas.
In January 2017, a site oﬀ the Preston New Road in Lancashire in
the northwest became ‘ground zero’ for the shale gas conﬂict in
England. A company called Cuadrilla Resources is engaged in site
preparation and, daily, shale gas activists stage demonstrations to slow
the pace of progress and to protest the UK Government’s decision to
allow drilling to proceed. There have been numerous arrests and the
cost of policing is running into the hundreds of thousands of pounds; yet
both sides seem determined to carry on regardless. A statement by the
European Academies’ Science Advisory Council (2014, 11) aptly sum-
marises the current situation. They maintain that: ‘…even if fully
compliant with laws and regulations, activities that are particularly
intrusive or perceived to carry signiﬁcant risks can be vetoed by a
hostile public through campaigns, legal actions, demonstrations or
other democratic pressures. Such industries must negotiate a “social
licence” with their community to conduct their business.’
This paper deploys a critical engagement with the social licence to
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operate (SLO) and the social, actuarial, and political risk and licensing
model (SAP Model) to explore the national context and local speciﬁcs of
the shale gas conﬂict in Lancashire. It is organised into three sections:
the ﬁrst reviews public attitudes toward and understandings of shale
gas development in the UK; the second presents a critical assessment of
the SLO and introduces the SAP model. The third section uses the SAP
model as a framework to analyse evidence from the Cuadrilla Resources
planning appeal in Lancashire to map the contours of the shale gas
conﬂict. This enables an assessment of the status of the various licences
and their interaction. In the conclusion, discussion returns to the SLO
and the SAP model and considers their eﬃcacy in framing an analysis of
the shale gas conﬂict in England. The wider implications of the conﬂict
are also considered.
2. Context and review
This section provides the context for the conceptual and empirical
components that follow. The ﬁrst part uses UK government opinion
surveys to chart changing public attitudes towards shale gas develop-
ment in the UK. The second part presents a brief review of published
academic research by UK social scientists on public perceptions of shale
gas.
2.1. Public perceptions and understanding
Since 2012, the Department of Energy and Climate Change (now the
Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy or BEIS) has
conducted a quarterly survey (known as the Wave Survey) that captures
changing public attitude towards key energy and climate change issues
at the national scale. The most recent data (Wave 21) was collected
from a representative sample of 2180 UK households between 29 March
and 2 April 2017 (BEIS, 2017). Questions about shale gas have been
included in the survey since June 2012.
What do the Wave Surveys say about public attitudes to shale gas?
First, there has been an increase in awareness over the period 2012,
with 76% of respondents in Wave 21 indicating that they are aware of
hydraulic fracturing for shale gas, up from approximately 40% in June
2012. However, this growth in awareness was not steady over this
period, rather there was a steep increase in awareness in the period
coinciding with the protests at Balcombe in West Sussex in the summer
of 2013—with levels relatively stable thereafter. Second, there has been
a gradual decline in support and an increase in the level of opposition.
In Wave 21, only 19% of respondents supported shale gas development;
while 30% opposed it, slightly down from the highest level of opposi-
tion (33%) in Wave 19 in autumn 2016. The share responding that they
‘neither support nor oppose’ has remained relatively stable at 49%, with
only 2% now replying that they ‘did not know’. In Wave 21, of the 49%
that ‘neither support nor oppose’ hydraulic fracturing for shale gas,
74% put this down to ‘not knowing enough about it’. Third, the survey
provides insight into the primary reasons for support or opposition. The
most frequent reasons for support were: need to use all available energy
sources; reduces dependence on fossils fuels (coal, oil); reduces de-
pendence from other countries, may result in cheaper energy bills, and
good for local jobs and investment. Conversely, the most frequent
reasons for opposition were: loss/destruction of natural environment;
risk of contamination to water supply; too much risk/uncertainty to
support at present; risk of earthquakes and not a safe process. How do
these trends compare with the rest of the EU? With the notable ex-
ception of Poland, signiﬁcant and rising levels of opposition to shale gas
is common across the EU, as are the concerns identiﬁed above
(Bradshaw, 2016).
Parallel surveys by the University of Nottingham (Andersson-
Hudson et al., 2016) show similar public attitudes in the UK. Their
latest survey (O’Hara et al., 2016), conducted by YouGov from 29
September to 3 October 2016, showed 37.3% of respondents in favour
and 41% against shale gas development. This was the ﬁrst time that the
share opposing was greater than those who supported development.
The two surveys are not directly comparable, and neither is long-
itudinal, nonetheless, they both suggest an increasing and now high
level of awareness with growing and now signiﬁcant opposition to shale
gas at the national level. The Nottingham survey explored the re-
lationship between knowledge and support and suggested there is a
positive relationship between the two, those who knew what shale was
were twice as likely to support its development (Stedman et al., 2016,
146). However, as the ‘knowledge gap thesis’ suggests (Rayner, 2004;
Sturgis and Allum, 2004), it would be misguided for industry and
government to assume that providing more ‘positive’ information to the
majority who are undecided due to a lack of knowledge would ne-
cessarily result in higher levels of support. Interestingly, the Not-
tingham researchers suggested using the Social Licence to Operate
framework to test approval at the local level (Andersson-Hudson et al.,
2016, 588).
2.2. Social science research on the perception of shale gas in the UK
Williams et al. (2015) explored public perceptions of hydraulic
fracturing in the UK and reported a feeling that the debate is too fo-
cused on economic issues at the expense of other areas of importance.
This results in a short-term outlook within the shale gas industry that is
likely to have negative impacts on environment and society. They
identiﬁed four key areas where public perceptions and institutional
framings of hydraulic fracturing for shale gas are not aligned. These are:
trustworthiness, inclusivity, somnambulism and epistemological pessi-
mism. Participants raised concerns about trustworthiness in relation to
institutional and governmental actors involved in the industry. Like-
wise, in relation to inclusivity, participants felt that greater considera-
tion should be given to democratic decision-making and the two-way
nature of public engagement, so that the public feels included in the
decision-making process. This is signiﬁcant for the later discussion of
the social licence and procedural justice. The issue of somnambulism
suggests that the approach to safety and regulation is tantamount to
sleepwalking into approving a potentially damaging activity. This
contrasts with a more precautionary approach that would presume
against development while high levels of uncertainty remain. Lastly,
the expression of epistemological pessimism highlights the tendency to
focus on the worst-case scenario and on areas of greatest uncertainty.
Many of the concerns recognised by Williams et al. (2015) are also
evident in the Whitmarsh et al. (2015) study; however, they empha-
sised several additional issues to be considered by the Government and
industry if they are to gain greater public support for shale gas. They
show that while there are high levels of ambivalence amongst the
public, attitudes are most strongly predicted by political aﬃliation and
attitudes towards climate change. In terms of opposition, the most
commonly raised concerns relate to the seismic risk associated with
fracking and the potential for the contamination of water sources. Fi-
nally, they considered public views in relation to the role that Gov-
ernment plays and noted that there are doubts associated with its
ability to eﬀectively regulate the industry and, in common with
Williams et al. (2015), there are concerns over the trustworthiness of
the government. Issues of trustworthiness, transparency and conﬂicting
discourses have also been explored by Bomberg (2017), Cotton et al.
(2014) and Cotton (2015, 2017). Beebeejaun’s (2017, 9) comparative
study of regulation in Texas and Lancashire concludes that: “The lack of
perceived transparency set a context within which activism started to
emerge, not least as an attempt to check the perceived pro-industry
approach of the UK government.” The lack of trust is also a widespread
concern in the US, as is the sense that government regulators are too
closely aligned with industry interests (Thomas et al., 2017a, 2017b).
A more recent US-UK comparative study explores how people shape
their attitudes towards shale gas (Partridge et al., 2017; Thomas et al.,
2017a, 2017b). In addition to the common issues identiﬁed above, that
tend to focus on short-term and site-speciﬁc concerns, the study
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concludes that attitudes are also shaped by longer term global issues,
namely the causes of climate change and the need for energy system
transformation. This chimes with the ﬁndings of Williams et al. (2015);
in that participants were critical of the short-termism of industry and
government that serves to perpetuate a dependency on fossil fuels. It is
the combination of these higher level and longer term global concerns
with shorter term and site-speciﬁc (community) impacts that makes
shale gas development such an intractable issue.
3. Conceptual framing
This section reviews and critiques the concept of the social licence
to operate (SLO). There are alternative approaches that we could have
adopted, such as social justice (Whitton et al., 2017), social sustain-
ability (Whitton et al., 2015), environmental justice, the related
emergent area of energy justice (Sovacool et al., 2016) or an ethical
(Evensen, 2016) or human rights approach (Short et al., 2015). How-
ever, we chose the SLO because the term is evoked by community ac-
tivists across England, which is not currently the case with the other
perspectives. The second part of the section introduces the SAP model
that is used to frame the analysis of the conﬂict over shale gas devel-
opment in Lancashire.
3.1. The social licence to operate
The concept of a SLO emerged in the late 1990′s in the mining in-
dustry (Boutilier, 2014), but only relatively recently has it begun to
receive scholarly attention (Prno, 2013; Brändle et al., 2016). Over the
intervening period the concept has become widely accepted across a
range of industries (Smith and Richards, 2015) and the language of the
SLO is now espoused by companies, governments and aﬀected com-
munities (Bice and Moﬀat, 2014; Lacey et al., 2012). The SLO has been
most prominent where the impact on local communities is severe and
thus requires the responsible companies to secure approval from those
aﬀected (Demuijnck and Fasterling, 2016).
Smith and Richards (2015: 89) deﬁne the SLO as: “a tool whereby
companies manage socio-political risk by conforming to a set of implicit
rules imposed by their stakeholders… [a SLO] derives from commu-
nities’ perception of a company and its operations, comprised of a
company’s ongoing acceptance and approval from stakeholders.” Here
a SLO is something that a company acquires through its engagement
with aﬀected communities. Yet, despite the widespread application of
the SLO, precisely what constitutes a SLO and what processes are re-
quired to obtain and maintain a meaningful licence remains unclear
(Bice, 2014; Moﬀat and Zhang, 2014). In fact, a company is more likely
to know when it does not have a SLO, thus it is considered by some as a
“crude form of negative governance” (Owen and Kemp 2013: 4).
Thomson and Boutilier (2011: 1786)Thomson and Boutilier,
2011Thomson and Boutilier (2011: 1786) identiﬁed three major ele-
ments that comprise successful achievement of a SLO: social legitimacy,
credibility, and trust. They maintain, legitimacy is achieved through
community engagement, raising awareness of the company and ac-
knowledging community concerns, whilst adhering to context-speciﬁc
norms, customs and practices. Companies then seek to gain credibility
and secure trust amongst the local public.
Alongside these three elements of a SLO, Boutilier et al. (2012)
deﬁne four levels of a SLO. The lowest level is withdrawal which occurs
when there is no SLO in place and consequently industrial activity does
not occur (this assumes that communities have the power to stop de-
velopment). The second level is acceptance, using Thomson and
Boutilier (2011) elements of SLO, acceptance is achieved when legiti-
macy is established, but credibility is lacking. When both have been
achieved, the approval level is established and it can be understood that
there are no longer socio-political risks associated with the industrial
activity. When there is full trust in a company and their operations are
fully supported by the community, psychological identiﬁcation is
considered to have been achieved, but this is very rare.
There is increasing recognition within controversial industries, like
shale gas, that regulatory compliance alone is insuﬃcient to address
societal concerns (Moﬀat and Zhang, 2014; Wilson, 2016). To acquire a
SLO, meaningful collaboration and engagement is required with the
local community. Impacted individuals and communities are empow-
ered to shape and ultimately grant or withhold the SLO (Harvey and
Bice, 2014; Wilson, 2016). Surveys from the mining industry identify
the key factors determining a SLO as: a respected corporate reputation,
a recognition and understanding of local culture and history; and open
communication with, and education of, local stakeholders (Prno and
Slocombe, 2012). The resultant SLO is place- and project-dependent
and is therefore non-transferable (Wilson, 2016). Nor is a local licence
scalable to a national agreement. Thus, the idea that an entire industry
can obtain a social licence at a national level seems untenable; although
the use of a set of industry-wide principles could be agreed to aid ac-
quiring a SLO. The IEA (2012) ‘Golden Rules for a Golden Age of Gas’
could be an example of such a set of principles. However, the ‘social
dimension’ is notably absent from the European Commission (2014)
recommendations relating to shale gas exploration and production.
Finally, a SLO is dynamic and once achieved there is no guarantee that
it will be maintained (Yates and Horvath, 2013), unlike an environ-
mental impact assessment that is a requirement at the start of a project
(Hall et al., 2015). Instead, a company must continue to engage with
the local community and demonstrate responsible working practices
throughout their operations and beyond (Harvey and Bice, 2014).
The SLO has been critiqued on two fronts, ﬁrst in terms of its utility
and second with regards to its capability as an analytical tool. Critics
maintain that its utility has been overstated (Owen and Kemp, 2013).
Underlying this is the lack of clarity in terms of the ability of public
stakeholders to approve or prevent industrial activity (Wilson, 2016)
and through this the view that it may grant the public too much au-
thority and consequently undermine the rule of law (Smith and
Richards, 2015). This suggests a tension between the perceived capacity
of a community to stop a project by withholding a SLO and the actual
legal basis upon which a project might be allowed or prohibited. Some
question the usefulness of the SLO as an analytical tool. Initially in-
troduced as a metaphor, Bice (2014:63) recognises that: “even meta-
phors require clear boundaries to make them meaningful.” Nonetheless,
there is a general agreement that there is scope for further studies of
SLO that might allow for a more nuanced approach to understanding
the social dimensions of industrial activity (Owen and Kemp, 2013;
Moﬀat and Zhang, 2014). Doing so will increase the eﬀectiveness of the
concept as an analytical tool, as well as providing industry with clearer
guidance as to how to secure a social licence (Wilson, 2016). Equally, a
clear understanding of what constitutes a SLO may empower commu-
nities in their interactions with industry and regulators.
3.2. The SAP model
Having reviewed the SLO, we argue that in the case of the shale gas
conﬂict in England, a more holistic conceptual framework is required
that places it within the wider legal and political contexts. To that end,
Bice et al. (2017) propose the use of a social-actuarial-political risk and
licensing model (SAP Model) in the extractive sector (Fig. 1). They
build on Morrison’s (2014, 12) approach linking political, legal and
social licences and Haines (2011) dynamic risk framework. Bice et al.
(2017, 48) suggest that the model: “…represents the wheel of inﬂu-
ences and interactions between complex and competing groups, all
rotating around a dynamic but central ‘public interest’.” For our pur-
poses, the SAP model serves as a heuristic device, a general concept that
we use to organise our analysis of the evidence from the public enquiry
in Lancashire. Further, considering the Social, Actuarial (legal) and
Political licences together acknowledges that the concept of SLO is in-
creasingly using the language of other legal licences (Hall et al., 2015)
as the eﬃcacy-if not the necessity-of obtaining an SLO alongside other
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formal licences is recognised (Koivurova et al., 2015).
A strength of the SAP model is that public interest—understood as
public welfare—is at its heart. A second strength is that all the stake-
holders are in play, although the model says little of the complexity of
the interactions between them in relation to the licensing landscape.
The model operates at a national scale, with communities just one of
many stakeholders; as we shall see, this raises interesting question
about the speciﬁcity of the SLO to a particular project and the aﬀected
communities. From the company perspective, the diﬀerent licences
serve to mitigate the various risks that threaten the success of their
operations. From the viewpoint of the public the diﬀerent licences can
be considered as arenas of accountability where they can make their
concerns known, either through formal channels and/or activism. In the
context of the shale gas conﬂict, the Actuarial licence (Morrison’s legal
licence) is the regulatory regime that companies must adhere to for
lawful operation and is thus formal and enforceable. It can be rescinded
if companies fail to operate appropriately. The Political licence is a re-
presentation of a political agenda and national government’s support
for an industry. Third, as previously discussed, the Social licence can be
deﬁned as social acceptance and approval of companies, industries and
their operations (Moﬀat and Zhang, 2014).
Bice et al. (2017) identify three types of associated risk. Actuarial
(legal) risk relates to the physical damage (harm), ﬁnancial loss and
reputational damage associated with a company’s failure to be com-
pliant with existing regulations. Social risks are: “experienced by in-
dividuals and communities as signs of danger and allow community
members to signal their concerns for the broader society in which they
live.” The earlier discussions of public perceptions and understanding of
shale gas enumerated a wide range of social risks linked to the industry.
There are two aspects to Political risk, ﬁrst as a threat to a government’s
legitimacy and second, as:” the economic responsibilities and accordant
risks that governments face via their responsibility to ensure appro-
priate resources to support the public interest.” The SLO literature
suggests that there must be clear material beneﬁt for aﬀected com-
munities and political actors have a key role to play in ensuring the just
distribution of beneﬁts. This notion of distribution justice is also central
to the concept of social justice and related work on energy justice. The
model enables the power relationships between the various actors and
tensions to be explored. However, one short coming of the approach,
noted above, is that it fails to handle the complexity that geographical
scale adds to the risk and licensing landscape. Actuarial and political
licences gained at the national level do not necessarily translate into
local political legitimacy and a SLO. Against this background, the re-
mainder of this paper uses the SAP Model to analyse the conﬂict over
shale gas exploration in England through the lens of the public inquiry
in Lancashire that took place in spring 2016.
4. Learning from Lancashire
Formed in 2007, Cuadrilla Resources is a private UK-based company
involved in the exploration and production of unconventional oil and
gas. They have seven active sites, where there is ongoing work—across
the Bowland Shale Basin (for a history of development in the region see:
Tootill, 2013). It is worth noting that their early activities in the region
did not attract attention. It was only after drilling at Preese Hall in May
2011 triggered minor seismic events, resulting in a national mor-
atorium on shale gas drilling between November 2011 and December
2012, that they came under closer scrutiny. This was compounded
when they sought to drill for oil at in Balcombe, in West Sussex, in
2013.
The following analysis draws on four planning applications sub-
mitted to Lancashire County Council (LCC) for exploratory drilling at
two sites (four wells at each site) and associated monitoring works,
Preston New Road (PNR) and Roseacre Wood (RW). In June 2015, the
LCC refused permission for three of these applications; the exploratory
drilling at both sites and the monitoring works at PNR. It is noteworthy
that the local Planning Oﬃcers recommended approval of the PNR
application (see Tootill, 2017 for an activist’s assessment). Cuadrilla
subsequently appealed all four decisions and a public inquiry, heard by
a Planning Inspector—Wendy McKay LLB, Solicitor (non-practi-
sing)—was held at Blackpool Football Club 9 February to 16 March
2016 (19 days). A report was submitted to the Department for Com-
munities and Local Government (DCLG) in July 2015 and a ﬁnal de-
cision on the applications was announced by the Secretary of State in
October 2016. The two supporting groups were: Cuadrilla Resources
and the North &Western Chamber of Commerce (NWCOC). The seven
opposing groups were: Lancashire County Council, Friends of the Earth,
two residents’ groups—the Roseacre Awareness Group (RAG) and the
—and three Parish Councils. During the inquiry, there were also op-
portunities for the public to pose questions and express their views.
In her report, the Planning Inspector recommended that planning
permission be granted at PNR—both for drilling and monitoring and
that at RW the refusal of planning to drill be upheld, but that permis-
sion for monitoring be agreed. The Minister, Sajid Javid, announced his
decisions on 6 October 2016 and agreed with three of the re-
commendations (subject to conditions), but in the case of the drilling
application at RW he gave Cuadrilla more time to address concerns
about highway safety (DCLG, 2016). The emphasis here is not on the
decisions of the Minister, but on the wider lessons that can be drawn
from the public inquiry and subsequent actions by the community.
The remainder of this paper draws upon a qualitative analysis of the
documentation produced and published online from the public inquiry
(POSL, 2016). The planning inquiry was also publically broadcast on-
line and the data from this comprised the second part of our dataset. We
have also followed the activities of community activists since the
Minster’s decisions were handed down. Our analysis focuses on the key
issues and debates that unfolded during the inquiry, as well as sub-
sequent community reactions, which we also link to the issues identi-
ﬁed in national surveys of public attitudes. Data was analysed thema-
tically using the three types of licence proposed in the SAP model −
social, actuarial and political − as a guiding framework. This involved
a detailed qualitative assessment of the various outputs generated by
the Inquiry, but we did not use qualitative data analysis software. The
reason for this is that, in relation to the SLO element, we focused on the
public sessions that only have a video record. The remainder of this
empirical section is structured using these three licences. Unless
otherwise stated, the quotations included were transcribed from the live
video stream that was provided for much of the public inquiry and
Fig. 1. The SAP Model–reproduced with permission from Bice et al. (2017).
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freely available online for a limited period after the conclusion of the
inquiry (i.e. they are from the public record).
4.1. Actuarial (legal) licence
As noted above, this is the regulatory regime that companies must
adhere to for lawful operation and is thus formal and enforceable. The
governance of the shale gas industry in England is complex and multi-
scalar, incorporating a range of regulatory bodies (see DECC 2016,
Bradshaw, 2017 and Skea, 2017). The organisations responsible for li-
censing, permitting and monitoring are national bodies: the Oil and Gas
Authority (an independent agency that works with BEIS), the En-
vironment Agency and the Health and Safety Executive (both within
Department for Environment, Food and Agriculture or DEFRA). How-
ever, the decision as to whether to allow drilling and hydraulic frac-
turing for shale gas lies at the local scale because it requires planning
permission from LCC’s Planning Committee.
It is relatively straightforward to assess whether a company is in
possession of an actuarial licence. At the time of the initial planning
hearing, in June 2015, Cuadrilla had a Petroleum Exploration and
Development Licence (PEDL) and was in possession of the necessary
environmental permits, however, until local planning permission is
granted, Cuadrilla does not have an actuarial licence for drilling and
hydraulic fracturing for shale gas in Lancashire. Looking at the four
applications, there are several key areas of disagreement that stem from
the original reasons for planning permission refusal by LCC in June
2015 (details can be found in the LCC planning documentation avail-
able at: POSL, 2016 and LCC, 2017). The monitoring works application
at RW was granted with conditions and ahead of the public inquiry LCC
and Cuadrilla had agreed conditions that would be acceptable to both
parties. The monitoring works application at PNR was refused contrary
to the Council’s Planning Oﬃcers’ recommendation, based on their
adverse impacts on the landscape character and their industrialising
eﬀect on the countryside. Cuadrilla maintained that their environ-
mental statement, submitted as part of the initial planning application,
had adequately assessed the visual impact of the monitoring arrays.
However, given that the proposal was to install 80 monitoring arrays,
the LCC planning committee felt that the cumulative impact of the
application would not be in keeping with the overall character of the
landscape and therefore the application would contravene policy EP11
of the Fylde Borough Local Plan regarding building design and land-
scape character of new developments.
The RW application was refused in line with the recommendation of
Planning Oﬃcers based on the impact on traﬃc and the rural highways
network. This was despite Cuadrilla suggesting that their traﬃc man-
agement plan was suﬃcient to mitigate these impacts and that periods
of intense HGV movement would be limited to an aggregate period of
twelve weeks over the course of the six-year application period. The
adverse impact of noise from the exploratory works was cited as the
reason for refusal of planning permission at both PNR and RW. It be-
came evident during the public inquiry that there were disagreements
between the appellants, Cuadrilla and LCC, as to what the most ap-
propriate guidelines are for industrial noise during the day and night.
Several sources of guidance were cited during the inquiry including
’DEFRA’s Noise Policy Statement, Planning Practice Guidance − Noise
and the World Health Organisation Night Noise Guidelines for Europe.
To quote from the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF 2012,
29), one aspect of the planning inquiry was to determine the level of
noise that would not give rise to “signiﬁcant adverse impacts on health
and quality of life.”
Lastly, the planning application for PNR exploratory works was
refused on the grounds of visual impact, including consideration of the
impact of light from the drilling site. These concerns were also raised at
the RW site and the mitigation methods proposed by LCC were disputed
by Cuadrilla. Primarily this was to limit the height of the drill rig to
36m, which Cuadrilla believed to be unnecessary given the temporary
nature of the exploratory works. They also contended that the limit on
height would make negligible diﬀerence to the visual impact of the
site.10
Whilst these three issues were the key ones raised between Cuadrilla
and LCC during the public inquiry, they were also frequently referred to
during the open public sessions. These sessions bought to the fore sig-
niﬁcant issues with the actuarial licence and the extent to which the
public are persuaded that there is a robust regulatory framework in
place. In a Written Ministerial Statement, the then Secretary of State for
Energy and Climate Change Rudd (2015) declared that: “our regulatory
system is robust and we are proven world leaders… in well-regulated,
safe and environmentally sound oil and gas developments.” This is not
the conclusion reached by academic research by Hawkins (2014),
Stokes (2016) and Beebeejaun (2017, 11), the latter of whom stated:
“The planning process has now been challenged as an inadequate me-
chanism to assess the potential impacts of a British shale gas industry.”
Nonetheless, planning permission has now been granted to Cuadrilla at
PNR and they are in possession of an actuarial licence (these decisions
were subsequently upheld in the face of two legal challenges, one by the
PNRAG and one by a private citizen, but both decisions went to appeal
and a ﬁnal ruling has yet to be made). However, as discussed below, the
very fact that the previous Secretary of State at the DCLG (Greg Clark)
decided to make the ﬁnal decision on the appeal has undermined the
political legitimacy of those decisions as not reﬂecting local sentiment.
The reason given for the Minister making the decision: “…is because
the drilling appeals involve proposals for exploring and developing
shale gas which amount to proposals for development of major im-
portance having more than local signiﬁcance and proposals which raise
important or novel issues of development control, and/or legal diﬃ-
culties (BBC News, 2015).” Thus, Cuadrilla has gained its actuarial li-
cence to operate from national regulators and Ministers, against the
wishes of local politicians in Lancashire and most of the public that
attended the enquiry. However, it is also important to consider that
matters of ‘procedural justice’ are deemed critical to obtaining a social
licence and the intervention of the central government to secure the
actuarial licence has only added to the opposition’s sense of injustice
(see also Cotton, 2017 and Whitton et al., 2017).
4.2. Political licence
According to the SAP model, a political licence reﬂects a national
government’s support for an industry. In 2014, the then Prime Minister
David Cameron declared that his government was: “going all out for
shale.” This was then supported by the publication a joint DECC/DCLG
(2015) Shale Gas and Oil Policy Statement in August 2015 and a
Written Ministerial Statement made by the Secretary of State for Energy
and Climate Change in September 2015 (Rudd, 2015). This written
statement was frequently utilised by Cuadrilla during the public inquiry
as the Government’s stance is that: “there is a national need to explore
and develop our shale gas and oil resources in a safe, and sustainable
and timely way.” This national need results from a requirement to se-
cure energy supplies, support economic growth and reduce carbon
emissions, by utilising shale gas as a transition fuel whilst renewable
energy industries are being developed. It is noteworthy that the
Conservative Party (2017, 23) manifesto for the 2017 General Election
renewed the commitment to develop a shale gas industry and proposed
to: “set up a new Shale Environmental Regulator, which will assume the
relevant functions of the Health and Safety Executive, the Environment
Agency and the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial
Strategy. This will provide clear governance and accountability, be-
come a source of expertise, and allow decisions to be made fairly but
swiftly.” It also promised that: “Non-fracking drilling will be treated as
permitted development, expert planning functions will be established to
support local councils, and, when necessary, major shale planning de-
cisions will be made the responsibility of the National Planning Re-
gime.” None of this appeared in the subsequent Queen’s Speech, and its
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status remains unclear. However, we can still conclude that there is a
clear political licence to carry out exploration for shale gas on the part
of the national government in London (though not in Northern Ireland
and Wales, where moratoria are in place, or in Scotland where a public
consultation has been conducted and a ﬁnal decision is expected by the
end of 2017); however, it is just as important to consider the local
political legitimacy of shale gas exploration.
To understand fully the conﬂict in Lancashire, it is necessary to
explore the initial planning process that preceded the four appeals
being analysed here. The planning applications submitted by Cuadrilla
were ﬁrst considered by Planning Oﬃcers at LCC who made then made
recommendations to the LCC Planning Committee. The Planning
Committee is comprised of democratically elected County Councillors
who voted on the planning applications. It is signiﬁcant—though not
unusual—that both applications in relation to PNR were refused plan-
ning permission contrary to the recommendations of Planning Oﬃcers.
As highlighted in the LCC’s Opening Statement at the public inquiry this
was: “an example of local democracy in action.” It is also instructive to
consider the LCC’s response to the Minister decisions in October 2016:
“A local council, made up of councillors democratically elected by
local people, and charged with serving their interests, is exactly the
right body to make decisions on local matters. It is clear that the
government supports the development of a shale gas industry, but I
would ask them to do more to address the concerns of local com-
munities and the councillors who represent them by supporting the
best environmental controls” (Johnstone, 2016).
In relation to the political licence, it is necessary to consider the
position of the NWCOC, who spoke in support of Cuadrilla at the Public
Inquiry because of the potential for the shale gas industry to provide
jobs, income and ﬁnancial security for the region. Thus, at the local
scale there are contrasting opinions on local economic opportunities.
This raises the issue of who constitutes and represents the community?
There are clearly diﬀerences within the communities aﬀected by
Cuadrilla’s activities. The overwhelming public sentiment at the Public
Inquiry was opposition to shale gas exploration, but how representative
is that of the entire community? To ascertain that would require what
Whitton et al. (2017, 21) call a: ‘more socially-informed approach to
governance, facilitating articulation by stakeholders of what is priori-
tised and valued in their own communities.” Franks and Vanclay (2013)
suggest an alternative approach, the conduct of a social impact as-
sessment (SIA) as a way of identifying community concerns and as a
management tool essential to delivering and maintaining a SLO.
In sum, Cuadrilla has a political licence at the national scale;
however, at the local scale the possession of this licence is contested by
politicians and community activists. The elected councillors judged the
applications to have unacceptable impacts and consequently refused
planning permission. In the aftermath of the Minister’s decision, com-
munity activists have framed the shale gas conﬂict as being a threat to
local democracy, which does not sit well with the Conservative
Government’s support for localism (Cotton, 2017; Taite and Lynch,
2016). In August 2016, the introduction to the consultation on a Shale
Wealth fund stated: “The government is clear that local people should
have greater control and say in decisions that aﬀect them (HM Treasury
2016, 3).”
4.3. Social licence
There were four sessions during the inquiry when the public could
voice to the Planning Inspector their views on the planning applications
that were being appealed. During these sessions 19 individuals spoke in
support of Cuadrilla, whereas 127 spoke opposing the planning appli-
cations. These sessions provide important insights into the status of the
social licence and the issues that are at the forefront of public feelings
towards both Cuadrilla’s activity in Lancashire, as well as the shale gas
industry more broadly.
The key reasons presented to justify the development of a shale gas
industry in Lancashire focused on the potential for economic growth
and job creation. It was also argued that shale gas could provide a se-
cure, sustainable and aﬀordable energy resource that could help ensure
the UK’s energy security. It was for these reasons that McVicar (2016)
felt that a shale gas industry could help “secure the future for younger
generations.” Likewise, Standing (2016), an oﬀshore oil engineer
stated: “I do hope this inquiry overturns the refusal and can see past the
minor inconveniences caused by shale gas exploration and see the po-
tential beneﬁts.” Supporters also referred to the frequent use of data
from North America being presented by opponents to the applications,
Raynor (2016) explained that there is a need for: “balanced judgement
not direct inferences from the US where geology and regulatory regimes
are diﬀerent.” It was for these reasons, as well as the contrasting
numbers in support and opposition, that Linderman (2016) closed his
presentation to the inquiry by stating: “those who support may not be
shouting loudly but we do need to consider their views.”
However, the signiﬁcant number of people who spoke in opposition
to the planning applications suggests that Cuadrilla do not yet possess a
social licence to operate in Lancashire. This was emphasised by Styles
(2016) who used her presentation to discuss the components of a social
licence and noted that: “evidence of regulatory breaches and failure to
comply with planning conditions means that there are questions over
credibility and trust.” Ms Styles closed her presentation by referencing
the Wave Survey and the declining support for a shale gas industry and
questioned: “can a social licence ever be earned and on this basis, how
can this business operate?”
Local, national and global concerns about the environmental impact
of fracking were widely stated by the public, as well as by Friends of the
Earth who were an opposing party at the Public Inquiry. Through their
opening statement and representative witnesses, Friends of the Earth
(Dehon and Lewin, 2016) argued that the applications under appeal
contravened the NPPF and policy DM2 of the Joint Lancashire Site
Allocation and Development Management Policies, given the sustain-
able development commitment to reduce UK carbon emissions. Sub-
sequent, unsuccessful legal appeals, sought to argue that the Minister’s
decisions were unsound because they failed to consider the impact of
the activities on climate change. These concerns were echoed in the
public sessions with comments such as: “[there are] enough green en-
ergy solutions without having to go down this dirty road” (Sanderson,
2016) and the: “applications are in the wrong place and in the wrong
century” (Mitchell, 2016).
The most frequently stated reasons for opposing fracking related to
pollution. Residents were concerned about: air pollution caused by
ﬂaring of methane and increased industrial traﬃc; water pollution from
ﬂowback ﬂuid from drilling and hydraulic fracturing operations; the
possibility of groundwater contamination; and light and noise pollution
from industrial activity. Related to this, Green (2016) spoke about the
ecological impacts that this activity declaring that she spoke: “for the
environment that cannot speak for itself.” It was these local issues that
compounded the public’s fear for the loss of the peace, tranquillity and
the idyllic nature of the aﬀected area of the Fylde coast. There are
obvious parallels here to community opposition to onshore wind farms
and the notion of “place attachment” (Devine-Wright and Howes,
2010). In echoing LCC’s reasons for refusing the monitoring works
application at PNR, Livesey (2016) noted that: “to swap birdsong for
hydraulic drilling, that’s not rural, it’s industrialisation.”
Seismic activity was raised regularly in the public sessions. Several
of those who spoke had ﬁrst-hand experience of seismic activity having
felt the tremors from Cuadrilla’s hydraulic fracturing at Preese Hall in
2011. Sullivan (2016), who spoke at the inquiry from both a personal
perspective and in her role as a representative of the union Unite,
highlighted the result of this was to: “undermine the credibility of
Cuadrilla” as to date they have: “100% fracking failure.” This is sig-
niﬁcant in the context of obtaining and maintaining a SLO as credibility
is a key component (Thomson and Boutilier, 2011).
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Lancashire residents are particularly concerned about the physical
and mental health impacts of fracking. In the case of physical health
impacts, cancers, respiratory problems and changes to blood pressure
were frequently raised. The validity of the Public Health England report
into Shale Gas (2013) was repeatedly questioned, with data and re-
search from the USA considered a more reliable source of information
(see Medact, 2016 for an alternative assessment). Likewise, for mental
health problems, several speakers were open about already suﬀering
from stress, anxiety and depression because of the possibility of shale
gas extraction taking place in their neighbourhood. Szolucha’s (2016:
29–49) community-level research highlights these issues and Short and
Szolucha (2017), who have also analysed the planning decisions, write
about the ‘collective trauma’ experienced by the aﬀected communities.
Negative economic impacts were also a common theme running
through the public sessions. Despite the potential for stimulating eco-
nomic growth as suggested by Cuadrilla, the NWCOC and in the Written
Ministerial Statement, there were clear concerns that any jobs created
by the shale gas industry would not counteract loses in tourism and
agriculture. HM Treasury (2016) is currently amid consultation about a
‘Shale Wealth Fund’ that aims to: “…ensure that the beneﬁts of shale
developments are shared by communities and regions in which the
resource is developed.” The industry also has a community beneﬁts
scheme, but this is considered by activists to be either insuﬃcient or
tantamount to a bribe. The issue of economic costs and beneﬁts raises
important questions about distributional justice that are essential for a
SLO. The impact of a shale gas industry on house prices and related
housing issues was raised by many speakers. This was the subject of a
controversial DEFRA (2015) report whose full publication was delayed
until after the initial planning decisions in June 2015. Recent academic
analysis (Gibbons et al., 2016) suggests that the seismic events asso-
ciated with Cuadrilla’s drilling in 2011 did result in a 2.7–4.1% de-
crease in local house prices. At the inquiry, several people spoke from
personal experience about falling house prices and their struggles to sell
their properties because of the possibility of nearby fracking. Home
owners close to the proposed sites and near Cuadrilla’s existing sites in
Lancashire spoke about issues relating to subsidence, damage from the
earth tremors at Preese Hall and the lack of insurance available for
properties to cover issues arising from shale gas activity.
Two other key issues were frequently raised during the public ses-
sions and can therefore be considered as constitutive factors to the re-
sidents of the Fylde withholding a SLO. The ﬁrst of these concerns was
the stated temporality of the exploratory activity that was used by
Cuadrilla to describe the impacts as a short-term inconvenience. As
Roseacre resident, Hulme (2016) outlined:
“…this is the lid to Pandora’s box and should be judged as such. We
have been told the eﬀects are temporary, short-term and aﬀect few
people. It will only temporary and short-term if the project fails to
deliver.”
Residents were concerned about a permanent legacy of risk in the
subsurface given the existence of abandoned wells and it was for this
reason that Dryden (2016) stated that: “it is misleading to say that they
are temporary.” Related to this was the overwhelming concern of the
public that the regulatory system is not suﬃciently robust. This view in
particular was emphasised by Hill (2016) who has contributed to Na-
tional and EU reports on shale gas: “fracking…, cannot possibly be al-
lowed to go ahead. It would be against all good engineering principles,
human decency and common sense.” The perceived insuﬃcient nature
of the regulatory framework extended to long-term monitoring of the
abandoned wells. Cannon (2016) asked that the planning inspector:
“register the lack of conﬁdence felt by the local community on the
regulatory system for monitoring abandoned wells.” Therefore, despite
there being a regulatory framework in place, there remain clear con-
cerns amongst the aﬀected public as to how eﬀective this regulation
will be in protecting them and the environment. It is for this reason and
all the other concerns outlined here that Westgarth (2016) stated:
“Cuadrilla do not have and will never have a social licence to frack the
Fylde.”
The day that Communities Secretary Sajid Javid announced that he
was overturning the decisions reached by Lancashire Country Council
the PNRAG (2016) released a press statement entitled: “Local Democ-
racy is Dead.” They went on to state that: “There is no social licence to
proceed with fracking in Lancashire. It is deplorable that an industry
which has been rejected on every level seems to believe it is acceptable
to inﬂict itself on an unwilling county. That is neither right, nor fair and
not least, it is wholly undemocratic.” They ended their statement by
saying: “This is not the end. We will challenge this.”
5. Conclusions
What does the Lancashire case tell us about the shale gas conﬂict in
England? First, the diﬀering opinions and concerns made evident in
national opinion polls and more detailed qualitative research were
evident throughout the Cuadrilla planning inquiry. Thus, the
Lancashire case serves as ‘ground truth’ for the academic research and
opinion polls that describe the reasons for growing opposition to shale
gas development. The company maintains that it can mitigate the risks
associated with their operations and statements from central
Government were used to state that shale gas exploration was in the
national interest and that communities would be safeguarded by a ro-
bust regulatory system. Those from the community that opposed
Cuadrilla had little faith in the regulatory system and were not per-
suaded about the economic beneﬁts, rather they were concerned that
the economic costs were greater. They were also concerned about a
range of potentially negative economic and social impacts that are as-
sociated with shale gas activity elsewhere; and they also have ﬁrst-hand
experience of the seismic risks. Finally, they did not see shale devel-
opment as compatible with the UK’s climate change policy (Climate
Change Committee, 2016). Community activists maintain that shale gas
exploration should not be allowed in Lancashire, or anywhere else for
that matter, thus, there is no discussion of the terms under which shale
gas development might be granted a social licence to operate.
What then is the utility of the SLO as a concept and the SAP as an
analytical framework? Activists in Lancashire, and elsewhere in
England, are making clear the lack of a SLO to articulate their oppo-
sition to shale gas development. Yet, the Lancashire case also makes
clear that because the SLO lacks legal standing, companies can proceed
without it. However, as the SAP model elaborates, to do so exposes
them to risks that threaten their success. Daily, Cuadrilla must deal with
protests at PNR, and the protestors are now blockading companies that
supply Cuadrilla. Furthermore, across England at every site where shale
gas development is contemplated there is likely to be a local activist
group, protests and heightened media interest. Every planning com-
mittee hearing becomes an arena for conﬂict, with local government
caught in the middle. Ultimately, the national Government may face
challenges to its legitimacy if it continues to support an industry that,
rightly or wrongly, is so widely opposed. The industry cites early op-
position to mobile phone towers as an analogue and maintains that
once drilling starts the public will realise that their fears are unfounded.
However, shale gas may turn out to be more like GM crops and could
fail in the face of public opposition.
A strength of the SAP framework is that it puts the multiple stake-
holders involved in the shale gas conﬂict into play and it focuses on
three critical dimensions: the political, the actuarial and the social.
However, it is clearly not the case that the shale gas industry in England
requires all three to operate. In Lancashire, Cuadrilla is proceeding with
the beneﬁt an actuarial licence—facilitated by national government
intervention—and a national political licence; but without local poli-
tical support and a SLO. The outcome in Lancashire raises critical
questions about both procedural and distributional justice (Whitton
et al., 2017). The Lancashire case demonstrates a weakness in the SAP
model in handling the complexity of scale. The literature suggests that a
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SLO is a local, project speciﬁc, construct; yet the SAP model links it to
national political support. The real problem with shale gas is that the
supposed beneﬁts are at the national scale—energy security, balance of
payments etc.—while the costs are both local and global. Local in the
sense that it is the aﬀected communities that suﬀer negative impacts,
and global in the sense that shale gas development is seen by activists as
contributing to the problem of climate change. To progress, the SAP
model must become more sensitised to the scalar complexities of the
licensing landscape.
Clearly, the current conﬂict in Lancashire has wider signiﬁcance for
the progress of the shale gas industry in the UK. No doubt the appli-
cation of the SAP model to other sites in the UK, such as Kirby
Misperton in North Yorkshire and Balcombe in West Sussex would re-
veal the same asymmetry between national political support, one the
one hand, and local opposition and protest and the absence of social
licence, on the other hand; but in those cases, the companies involved
gained all the required legal licences. Cuadrilla has chosen not to
continue with developments at Balcombe, but Third Energy will soon
be hydraulically fracturing an existing vertical well at Kirby Misperton.
At the same time, the contours of the conﬂict have much in common
with growing opposition elsewhere in North America, Australia and
Argentina, for example, and explain the status of the industry in
Europe. Ultimately, the shale revolution may have heralded a new age
of relative fossil fuel abundance, but public opposition to exploration
and development will continue to challenge the pace of exploration and
will constrain the eventual level of production.
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